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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear this appeal is 
conferred by Sec. 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The 
appeal is from a judgment of dismissal in favor of the Appellees 
pursuant to their motion for summary judgment before Honorable 
Richard H. Moffat, Third District Court. 
OBJECTION TO APPELLANTS BRIEF 
The Appellees object to consideration of the Appellant's 
brief by the court in that the brief fails to cite to the record. 
The Appellees specifically requests that the court strike all 
references to a deposition which has not been published nor made 
a part of the record •
 tA 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Although, the Plaintiff raised three issues on appeal, the 
first two issues are essentially two sides of the same coin. The 
issues truly presented for review are as follows: 
1. Is it an abuse of discretion for the District Court to 
set aside an erroneously entered default judgment based only on 
an objection to a proposed order rather than pursuant to a formal 
motion to vacate under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures? 
2. Did the District Court err in finding that no genuine 
issues of fact exist to prevent summary judgment? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit to recover alleged damages as a 
result of injuries sustained by the Plaintiff while skateboarding 
at a skateboard park owned by Defendants Stanley L. Wade and 
Janet Wade, but leased and operated by Defendant Robert Iverson. 
Plaintiff has a default judgment against Robert Iverson. The 
case as against the Wades was dismissed with prejudice, no cause 
of action, on the basis that the admitted cause of the injury was 
the result of a potential fault of the tenant, not the landlord. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Troy Darrington, filed this action for damages 
for injuries, allegedly suffered on defendants' property on or 
about June 5, i?83. Amended Complaint, Paragraph 4, R. 189. The 
plaintiff's injuries were alleged to have been sustained while 
plaintiff was on defendants' property. R. 189. The plaintiff 
admitted that on the date of the injuries the property was leased 
to a Bob (Robert) Iverson and that he was responsible for 
supervising the condition of the premises. Aff i day i t of Troy 
Parrinoton. R. 427 (hereafter "Darrington affidavit"). The 
plaintiff admitted that after the property was leased to Robert 
Iverson, the skateboard run that he used, had a cover on it, but 
the cover was missing on the day of the injury. Parr i noton 
affidavi t, R. 427, 423. The lease contract between Defendants 
Wade and Iverson, granted full, complete and exclusive control of 
the premises to the tenant reserving no rights of entry, 
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inspection or repair to the Wades. Lease agreement. R. 426. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court's grant of sanctions striking Defendants' 
pleadings and awarding default Judgment was based on the mistaken 
belief that Stanley L. Wade disobeyed many court ordered 
discovery requests; and second, that the Wades have deliberately 
delayed the resolution of the case. Pursuant to Defendants' 
Objection to the Proposed Order of Sanctions, the District Court, 
reviewed the file, and discovered that the claimed delay by the 
Defendants and the alleged disobedience of Court orders by the 
Defendants were false. The District Court then vacated the order 
of Sanctions and Default Judgment. The court has the authority 
to make such a ruling; additionally, the ruling was clearly 
justified from the record. 
The admitted and established facts before the District Court 
clearly point to an act by the tenant of removing a drain cover 
which is admitted was the cause of the Plaintiff's fall allegedly 
sustaining his injuries. The prevailing view is that the 
Landlord is liable for his own negligence, but not for the 
tenant's negligence. Therefore, the District Court is clearly 
correct in fact and law in dismissing the complaint and its 
ruling must be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
The claims of errors presented by the Plaintiff are without 
merit. The District Court's decision must be affirmed, and the 
appeal dismissed with prejudice with an award of Appellees costs 
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including attorney -fees, 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS DISCRETION TO SET ASIDE ITS OWN 
ORDERS OR JUDGMENTS. 
The Plaintiff's brief failed to cite to any authority that 
the District Court could not reconsider its own orders or 
judgment. The Plaintiff also failed to cite to any authority for 
his proposition that the District Court can set aside its own 
orders only pursuant to a motion to set aside under Rule 60(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedures. On the other hand, authorities 
abound as to the District Court's power to vacate its own orders 
or judgments. The District Court could open up the judgment, 
enter new findings and new conclusions or even enter a totally 
new and different judgment. Please see for example: Tebbs & 
Tebbs v. 01iveto, 256 P.2d 699 <Ut. 1953); Haslam M, Paulsen, 33? 
P.2d 736 <Ut. 1964); Smi th v. Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 <Ut. 1976). 
Lembech v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 <Ut. 1981). Rule 59(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedures. 
In the recent case of Salt Lake City M. James Construction, 
Inc. 761 P.2d 42, 44 <Ut. Ct. App. 1988), the Court of Appeals 
stated that, although a motion to reconsider is not expressly 
available under the Rules of Civil Procedure, "However, by 
implication Rule 54(b).... does all QUI for the possibility for the 
judge changing his or her mind in cases involving multiple 
parties or multiple claims." (Emphasis added). 
The District Court in the instant case, clearly had the 
authority to vacate its own ruling. Additionally, and as seen 
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below, the District Court's action was clearly supported by the 
record• 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING VACATING, THE ORDER OF 
SANCTION STRIKING DEFENDANT'S PLEADINGS AND ENTERING DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT, IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The District Court mistakenly found, due to 
misrepresentations by the Plaintiff, that Stanley L. Wade 
disobeyed a court ordered discovery and that the Wades 
deliberately delayed the resolution of the case. When the 
District Court discovered that the Defendants fully complied with 
the Court ordered discovery and also that the delay in this case 
has been caused by the Plaintiff, the Court quickly correct the 
error and vacate the erroneous order. Suppiemental Statement« R. 
350 to 382. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT NO 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT REMAINS TO BE DECIDED. 
Although, one of the claimed errors is the existence of 
genuine factual issues, it is near impossible to identify the 
alleged factual issue from the Plaintiff's brief. The first 
reference to an allege factual issue in Plaintiff's brief are the 
three examples listed on Page 12, and re-stated here as follows: 
1. CD3id the Wades have a duty of reasonable care to 
prevent Darrington's injury? 
2. Did they CWades] breach that duty of car&? 
3. CD3id they CWades] know of the dangerous condition 
which caused Darrington's injury prior to their 
leasing the skateboard park? 
The same three issues, in slightly different wordings, were again 
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stated under Point II of the Plaintiff's brief on page 18. "A 
genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the Wades had a duty 
of reasonable care toward Darrington. .. ... ... CTUhe question of 
breach of a defendant's duty to a plaintiff is a question of fact 
for the jury... ... ... Did the Wades know or should they have 
known of the defects in the skateboard ramp prior to the lease?" 
The Plaintiff's assertion of the three listed issues as 
factual questions still in dispute to barr summary judgment 
defies reason and common sense. The issue of the Wades duty and 
breach of that duty is no longer in controversy. The Plaintiff 
admitted that the property was leased to Robert Iverson at the 
time of the accident, and the accident was caused by an act that 
could have been done only by Robert Iverson. R. 427, 428. Based 
on this admission, the District Court was bound to apply the 
existing law and find that the Wades, as mere landlords, had no 
duty to the Plaintiff for the potential negligence of the tenant. 
Please see discussion under Point IV below. 
Although the question of notice is moot when there is no 
duty, it must be pointed out to this court that the Plaintiff's 
admission, that the cause in fact of his injuries was an act or 
omission by Robert Iverson or someone under his control , it 
follows logically, that the knowledge of the landlord no longer 
has any bearing on the outcome of the claim. R. 427, 428. 
POINT IV. 
THE DEFENDANTS, LANDLORDS, ARE NOT LIABLE FOR THE 
ALLEGED INJURIES UNDER CURRENT LAW. 
The law is well settled here, as well as the majority of 
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other jurisdictions, as to the liability of a landlord, for 
injuries to a tenant's patrons occurring on the leased premises. 
A landlord is bound by the usual standard of 
exercising ordinary prudence and cars to see 
that premises he leases are reasonably safe 
and suitable for intended uses, and under 
appropriate circumstances, landlord may be 
held liable for injuries caused by any 
defects or serious conditions which he 
created, or of which he was aware, and which 
he should reasonably foresee would expose 
others to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
Stephenson v, Warner and Greenwood, 581 P2d 567, 568 <Utah 1978) 
citing 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, Sec 782$ Restatement, 
Torts, Sec 282. Also see Montoya vs, Berthana, 439 P2d 853 (Utah 
1968) . 
Although the landlord is not absolutely immune from 
liability, the landlord's liability, however, is limited to only 
two situations. First, the landlord is liable for injuries 
caused by defects or serious conditions he created; and second, 
the landlord is liable for any defects or serious conditions that 
he was aware of, or that he should reasonably foresee. Enol i sh 
v, Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) following 
Stephenson. Each of these conditions are addressed separately 
bel ow. 
A. THE WADES' DID NOT CREATE ANY DEFECTS OR SERIOUS 
CONDITIONS ON THE LAND WHICH CAUSED THE PLAINTIFF'S 
INJURIES. 
The plaintiff claimed that his injuries were caused when he 
fell after his skateboard, wheel was caught in an open drain, R. 
427, 428. The plaintiff admitted that the drain was covered on 
other occasions when he used the same skateboard run. Some of 
these occasions were after the park was leased by Robert Iverson. 
R. 427, 428. The drain cover was apparently removed when 
somebody was cleaning the drain and forgot to put the cover back 
on. If there is any negligence here, for failure to cover the 
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drain, the negligence belongs exclusively to Robert Iverson and 
those under his control . This clearly vindicates the Wades from 
any claim that they created the defect or dangerous condition. 
The cause of the injury as admitted was a matter completely 
within the control and responsibility of the tenant. 
B. THE WADES' WERE NOT AWARE OF THE OPEN DRAIN 
NOR COULD THEY HAVE FORESEEN THAT THE TENANT OR HIS 
EMPLOYEES WOULD FORGET TO COVER THE DRAIN. 
The Plaintiff admitted that he skateboarded at the 
skateboard park after Robert Iverson leased the park from the 
Wades. R. 427, 428. The Plaintiff also admitted that one of the 
skateboard runs was abandoned and was not to be used because it 
had no drain cover. R. 427, 428. The Plaintiff also admitted 
that he skateboarded on one of the usual runs which had a drain 
cover. The cover was missing from the same run on the day of the 
accident. The Plaintiff then asserts that because one skateboard 
run was closed at the time of the lease to Robert Iverson, due to 
the missing drain cover, the Wades knew or should have known that 
Robert Iverson, or someone under his control , would forget to 
cover the drain on one of the usual runs. This assertion is 
absurd. There is no duty for a landlord to be a psychic and 
foretell what his tenant will or wil1 not do. The Wades were not 
aware of the open drain nor could they have known that Robert 
Iverson would remove the cover from the drain. The lease 
agreement gave complete and full responsibility to the tenant 
reserving no rights of inspection or of entry, and the Defendants 
never entered the premises after the Lessee took possession. R. 
8 
426. 
The law is clear as applied to the -facts herein, "where the 
tenant creates or permits to come into existence a dangerous 
condition oa the premises after he has taken possession, it is 
the tenant rather than the landlord who is liable for injuries 
resulting from the danoerous condition," Greenwood, supra at 568. 
(Emphasis added). 
The District Court granted the Plaintiff a default judgment 
against the tenant, Robert Iverson. The Plaintiff is entitled to 
that judgment under the current state of the law. To attempt to 
extend said liability to the landlord is pushing beyond the 
limits of settled law. 
REQUEST FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
The Court please note that the totality of the record in 
this case speaks loudly of the improper conduct of the plaintiff 
and his counsel in bringing this case in the first place, let 
alone pursuing this appeal. This appeal violates Rule 33, Rules 
of this court against frivolous appeals. The Plaintiff's appeal 
has no reasonable legal or factual basis. Obrien v. Rush. 744 
P.2d 306 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987). The Wades have paid substantial 
costs and attorney fees to defendant this frivolous suit and 
appeal. The Wades pray for reimbursement for their costs and 
fees as the court deems just. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court has the power to vacate its own orders or 
judgments and at any time if justice dictates. Here, the 
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District Court was justified and was well within the bounds of 
its discretion to vacate its order of sanctions, striking 
defendant's pleading and entering default. The District Court's 
finding that no genuine factual issue remains in this case is 
supported by the record and admissions of fact by the Plaintiff. 
The Wades did not create, nor were they aware of, nor could 
they reasonably foresee a defect or dangerous condition on the 
property. The allege defect is attributed wholely to the actions 
or inactions of defendant, Robert Iverson. Plaintiff is entitled 
to his default judgment against the tenant, but not the landlord 
under current 1 aw• 
This appeal violates Rule 33, Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court in that it has no reasonable legal or factual basis, and 
the Defendant should be awarded all their costs including 
attorney fees. 
^ / S E -DATED this <=**' day of March, 1990. 
A.' Paul ($f^mt)U&7 
Attorney -TOT Appel1ees 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, with postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellees this 
2/^day of March, 1990, t< 
#120, Murray, Utah 84107. 
^ J day to Denver C. S n ^ f W , 6^^asT"i64Q0 South, 
-<^  
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FR.ES BIS115S6T (SGUHT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 5 1989 
By ttlu^^ 
n\ ' v Deputy Clerk // 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TROY DARRINGTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET WADE 
and ROBERT IVERSON 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Civil No. 830906695 
The Court having considered the defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Memorandum in Support thereof, the Reply 
to Summary Judgment, the Cross Motion for Entry of Default, the 
Memorandum in Opposition to the defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Support of the plaintiff's Motion to Re-enter 
Default and the objection to the defendant's Motion for Entry of 
Judgment of Dismissal filed on May 22, 1989 which pointed out 
that the prior Minute Entry in this matter was entered when the 
plaintiff's Reply in Opposition to the Motion to the Summary 
Judgment and other documents enumerated above were evidentially 
not in the file and having now reconsidered the matter, the Court 
c ::>; •\ M •,1 't 
makes this its: 
DECISION 
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
for the reasons, inter alia, as set forth in the Memorandum in 
Support thereof. The Court specifically finds that it is 
without dispute that the lease provided that the tenants would 
have the complete and exclusive control and possession of the 
premises and that under the law the defendant as landlords have 
no liability for injuries occurring on a leased premises absent 
of evidence of their negligence. None has been raised here, nor 
has any evidence been raised which alleged that these defendants 
created a condition which caused plaintiff's injuries. As a 
matter of fact the affidavit of Troy Darrington filed on April 
28th herein indicates that he was aware that a drain cover was 
missing from one of the skateboard runs and that that skateboard 
run was not in use. He says that as he visited the premises on 
subsequent occasions the missing drain cover was always in the 
same run and that that run was abandoned and unused. He then 
goes on to state that on the day of his injury he skateboarded 
on one of the usual runs from which a drain cover had been 
removed. It is obvious that the landlord could not have removed 
that drain cover as the sole possession of the premises had been 
surrendered under the lease to the tenant. Therefore even from 
the testimony or affidavit of the plaintiff himself it becomes 
apparent that his injury was caused by his use of a run which he 
normally had used from which the tenant had removed a drain 
cover. The Court can see no way in which this would be 
attributable to any act or failure to act on behalf of the 
landlord. The Judgment of Dismissal heretofore furnished in 
this matter will therefore be signed and entered. The Court is 
of the opinion that the defendant's Motion to Re-enter its prior 
Order of Dismissal in this case is not well taken and that 
motion is denied. 
Dated this day of May, 1989. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foreaoino/Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this (l(o r^~ day of May, 1989: 
A. Paul Schwenke 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mr. Denver Snuffer 
428 East 6400 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
FILED DttHKCTCaUW 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 3 1989 
Paul S. Schwenke (3951) 
Attorney for Defendant 
68 South Main Street 
Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone No.: (801) 531-8300 
IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TROY DARRINGTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET, 
Defendant, 
1 JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
1 Civil No. C 83 6695 
1 Judge Richard H. Moffat 
This matter came on regularly before the court on 
motion of defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet Wade, for an 
order granting an entry of judgment of dismissal on this action. 
The plaintiff has been represented by Denver C. Snuffer and A. 
Paul Schwenke represented the defendant. The matter was 
submitted for decision pursuant to a Notice to submit for a 
Decision, dated April 14, 1989. 
The court having been fully appraised of the facts in 
the record and as presented by Affidavit and having reviewed and 
examined the pleadings, memorandum filed in support of 
defendants1 motion for summary judgment, and good cause otherwise 
appearing. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Plaintiffs action herein is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of 
action, and the parties in this matter to kafte their own costs 
and attorneys fees accrued. 
DATED this 33 dayjifJMay, 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 
at 
day of May, 1989, a true 
and exact copy of the foregoing Judgment Of Dismissal was mailed 
postage prepaid to: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. Esq. 
488 East 6400 South #120 
Murray, Utah 84107 
